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1. Introduction 
 
Conceiving the ethnic ‘other’ as backward and primitive by the 
dominant cultural group of each epoch is a norm of international 
relations that dates back to antiquity. Ancient Greece considered non-
Greeks as ‘barbarians’, and firmly believed that these barbarians were 
born enemies designated by nature to serve the Greeks as slaves. 
Whereas Greek States held a strong feeling of ‘all-Greek kinship’ for 
one another – a feeling that they belonged to the same racial, cultural, 
lingual and religious community – despite their political segregation 
and discord.1 Other regional systems too approached international 
relations through the same dichotomous understanding of ‘self’ 
and ‘other’.2 
                                                 
* I am thankful to Professor Matthew Craven (SOAS, University of London), 
Professor David Kennedy (Harvard Law School), Professor Antony Anghie 
(University of Utah), and Professor YasuakiOnuma (University of Tokyo) for 
their insightful comments on the draft article.  
The author holds a PhD in international law (London). He is currently the 
Chairman of the Department of Law & Justice at Jahangirnagar University in 
Bangladesh. 
 
1 See Arthur Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations (NY: 
Macmillan, 1947), 11. 
2 In the interaction between the Christian Europe and the Muslim Orient, the latter 
too relied on its religious norms in inter-State relations. Thus, though citizens 
and diplomats of the Italian City States were granted concessions by Oriental 
rulers in the familiar form of franchises or diplomas, Muslim rulers were little 
interested in obtaining for their subjects reciprocal treatment in the respective 
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Thus, irrespective of the origin of international law or to put it 
more correctly, the debate about the origin of international law, it is 
evident that the body of rules governing international relations had 
been informed by notions of superior ‘self’ and inferior ethnic ‘other’. 
Among different regional systems of international law in antiquity and 
the Middle Ages, which were limited in their application, modern 
European international law having its root in the sixteenth-century 
jurisprudence emerged as a universal norm of interstate relations 
through the nineteenth-century colonial expansions.3 Since then, it has 
become the dominant language of European civilisation; it is the 
                                                                                                                   
European countries, for they thought the Mohammedan law forbade the believers 
to sojourn for any length of time in the lands of the infidels. Similarly, non-
Muslim settlers in Muslim States were allowed to preserve their own law given 
that “the Moslem law as set forth in the Koran was exclusively designed for the 
Moslem, who consequently did not care to regulate relations among infidels”. 
See Nussbaum, A Concise History, 38-39. Likewise, the Sinocentric tribute 
system claimed ethnic superiority by depicting the ‘other’ around it as 
‘barbarian’. The fundamental philosophy underlying the tribute system under the 
Chinese Empire was the rule by virtue, i.e. the emperor should embody virtue 
and spread it throughout under Heaven. Under this belief system, the rulers 
beyond the immediate influence of Chinese civilisation, i.e. non-East Asians, 
must also obey the Emperor – the only supreme authority under Heaven. As a 
general rule, even uncivilised people were expected to understand the virtue of 
the Emperor, and send a tributary mission to the emperor in order to share in his 
virtuous rule. See generally YasuakiOnuma, “When Was the Law of 
International Society Born?” Journal of the History of International Law 2 
(2000), 12-22. 
3 Tracing the necessity of international law in the face of the eruption of 
independent States in Europe, Oppenheim saw the emergence of this discipline 
in the seventeenth century; thus, he had no hesitation to enthusiastically 
recognise the Dutch diplomat Hugo Grotius as the “Father of Law of Nations,” 
for the “system of Grotius supplied a legal basis to most of those international 
relations which were at the time considered as wanting such basis.” See, Lassa 
Oppenheim, International Law (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1905), 58. 
This claim is not beyond controversy, however. Some influential publicists after 
the end of the nineteenth century, such as James Brown Scott, argued that those 
of the late Spanish school such as Francisco de Vitoria were the true founders of 
international law, while there were others who emphasised the importance of 
Vattel, pointing out modern, liberal features in his writing. See, Onuma, 5. See 
also AntonyAnghie, “Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in 
Nineteenth-Century International Law,” Harvard International Law Journal 40 
(1999)1, 1-80. 
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European ‘self’ that defines and deals with the non-European ‘other’ 
through international law, amongst other means.  
Yet, within this dichotomy of the European ‘self’ and the non-
European ‘other’, we can observe how the nineteenth-century 
European discourse on national self-images, within the framework of 
the liberal and conservative traditions, are reflected in the conception 
of the non-European ‘other’, and hence in corresponding policies 
dealing with the latter. This is best substantiated by the nineteenth-
century colonial projects. On the one hand, the justifications for 
colonial missions were expressed in light of the concept of the 
‘nation’ in the metropolis along the lines of liberal or conservative 
traditions. On the other hand, the same traditions explained the science 
of race – social Darwinism – in the parallel monogenic-assimilationist 
or polygenic-exclusionist streams4 to inform the hierarchical 
relationship between the Europeans and the natives in the colonies. 
During this period of empire building, as we shall soon see, the 
nineteenth-century jurists of both traditions, not only justified the 
colonial project, but also the atrocities associated with it. 
This article examines the colonial policy of nineteenth-century 
Germany to explore how its conservative treatment of ethnicity, in 
relation to the construction of the national ‘self,’ distinctively 
informed its understanding of colonialism as well as the actual 
execution of their colonial policies. To this end, I first offer an account 
of the nineteenth century German perception of ‘ethnicity’ as the core 
of the political organization of nation-states – the self-image of the 
                                                 
4 Dickens notes that in the 1860s, there was intense debate in Britain between the 
monogenists, who argued that there was a common ancestor for all human races, 
and the polygenists, who held the view that different races are indeed separate 
species. See Peter Dickens, Social Darwinism (Buckhingham: Open University 
Press, 2000), 14. For an account of social Darwinism, see M. Hawkins, Social 
Darwinism in European and American Thought, 1860-1945 (1997), 61-122; 
P. Dickens, Social Darwinism (2000), 7-25. Referring to Herbert Spencer as the 
pioneer of social Darwinism, Greene argues that the historical context of 
Darwin’s work in particular and the interaction between science and society in 
general tend to emphasise the links between Darwin and Spencer consisting of a 
network of shared assumptions and viewpoints about God, Nature, society and 
history, which rendered Spencer a ‘Darwinian before Darwin’. See J.C. Greene, 
Science, Ideology and World View (1981), 134, 140. For a Spencerian account of 
social evolution, see generally J.D.Y. Peel (ed), Herbert Spencer on Social 
Evolution – selected writings (1972). 
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nation vis-à-vis the ‘other’. Against this backdrop, my account of the 
German colonial project exposes how the interaction with the colonial 
‘other’ was reflected back in the dynamic process of the construction 
of the ‘self’ in the metropolis. While providing this narrative, 
I demonstrate how nineteenth-century international lawyers’ 
perceptions of the State – the legal form of the national ‘self’ – in the 
conservative tradition was essentially reflected in their justifications 
for colonialism. 
 
2. The Meaning of ‘Ethnicity’ in the German Romantic Tradition 
 
In the nineteenth century, the idea of ‘culture’ dominated the quest 
for constructing the self-image of a nation. This quest appears, in 
Gellner’s account, largely as the Romantic response to the 
Enlightenment. The Enlightenment was premised on the 
“individualistic, universalistic and egalitarian” ethic as opposed to the 
“oppression, dogmatisation, superstition and inequality of the agrarian 
age.”5 The Romantic response to the Enlightenment had its root in the 
German tradition. To the Germans, the authentic Kultur of the German 
people was to be preferred to the French notion of rational, scientific 
and universal civilisation – the Enlightenment.6 The eighteenth-
century German philosopher Johann Herder is one of the key 
proponents of this emergent Romantic nationalism who, despite 
acknowledging that all mankind shared the same basic attributes, 
claims that nations have modified their characters according to their 
specific cultural condition.7 The link to the specificity is so strong that 
Herder sees all the aspects of the population within a nation – the 
constitution of their body, their way of life, the pleasures and 
occupations to which they have been accustomed from their infancy, 
                                                 
5 Ernest Gellner, Nationalism (London: Weidenfeld& Nicolson, 1997), 64. See 
also Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983); 
E. Gellner, Culture, Identity, and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987). 
6 Adam Kuper, Culture (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 6-9. 
7 Johann Gottfried von Herder, “Reflections on the Philosophy of the History of 
Mankind (1791),” inOmar Dahbour and Micheline R Ishay 
(eds.),The Nationalism Reader (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1995), 48-57.  
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to the whole circle of their ideas – as climatic.8 And then he 
concludes: “Deprive them of their country, you deprive them of 
everything.”9 For him, the nation is like an enlarged family, and the 
most natural State is one which is composed of a specific people with 
a unique national character.10 It is, therefore, opposed to the verdict of 
nature, he argues, to expand the nation beyond its natural limits and 
thereby cause the indiscriminate mingling of various nations and 
human types.11 A nation, in the Herderian sense, is thus a unique and 
specific ethnic connotation.  
Like Herder, the German political theorist Johanne Fichte, too 
inclined to the uniqueness of the German Kultur, despite his strong 
faith in the universal solidarity enshrined in the French Revolution. 
This shift from liberal universalism to the locality of culture was 
caused by the increasing French expansionism, under the pretext of 
liberalism at the dawn of the nineteenth century.12 His perception of 
the international order and international law in the face of 
expansionism, thus, begins from the idea of mutual recognition of 
nations as well as mutual guarantees of security.13 His late works 
clearly reveal this shift from liberalism to Romanticism. In his 
celebrated work, Address to the German Nation (1808), less than a 
decade before he died, he portrays the German nation as an authentic 
entity with all its peculiar natural characteristics. The original and 
truly natural frontier of all States, he asserts, are undoubtedly their 
inner frontiers, in that  
“[t]hose who speak the same language are linked together, before human 
intervention takes a hand, by mere nature with a host of invisible ties; they 
understand each other and are capable of communicating more, and more 
                                                 
8 Ibid., 51. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Johann Gottfried von Herder, “Ideas towards a Philosophy of the History of 
Mankind (1785),” in Alfred Zimmern (ed.), Modern Political Doctrines 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1939), 165. 
11 Ibid. 
12 SeeJohanne Gottlieb Fichte, “An Outline of International and Cosmopolitan Law 
(1796-97),” in H.S. Reiss and P. Brown (eds.), The Political Thought of the 
German Romantics(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1955), 73-84.  
13 Ibid., 75. 
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closely with one another, they belong together, they are by nature one 
indivisible whole.”14 
 
These features are so peculiar to that particular nation that any 
nation of a different origin and language that would try to appropriate 
and absorb such a people could do this only by confusing itself as well 
as profoundly disturbing the uniform progress of its own education.15 
Fichte then concludes that only such a culturally specific inner 
frontier, drawn by the spiritual nature of man, “first gives rise to 
outward frontiers of territories as a direct consequence.”16 
Accordingly, he saw Germany as a culturally and linguistically unified 
entity, sufficiently distinct from all other nations, and located at the 
centre of Europe as a ‘dividing wall’ between the unrelated tribes 
surrounding this great nation.17 
Within this Romantic framework, no doubt, Fichte found the idea 
of universalism quite problematic; to take his words, ‘despicable’ and 
‘irrational’.18 He contends that the phenomenon of divinity reflects on 
a nation only when each nation develops and takes shapes in 
accordance with its own peculiarities; it is this peculiarity that 
guarantees the present and future dignity, virtue and merit of nations. 
In contrast, he warns, “if these qualities are dulled by mixture and 
disintegration there arises from this lack of peculiarity a separation 
from spiritual nature, and from this there arises the fusion of all in 
uniform and conjoint ruin”.19 Thus, his vision of the world comprises 
culturally specific nations. 
Compared to Herder and Fichte, the nineteenth-century scholars of 
German Historical School, such as Leopold Ranke, took a more 
conservative stance. For Ranke, the greatness of a nation lies not in 
the extent of possessions or the power of the troops or the amount of 
wealth or a certain share in the general civilisation, but in the moral 
strength of a nation and the sense of nationality – the two most 
                                                 
14 Johanne Gottlieb Fichte, “Addresses to the German Nation – Thirteenth Address 
(1808),” in The Political Thought of the German Romantics, 102. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., 102-103.  
17 Ibid., 103. 
18 Ibid., 108. 
19 Ibid. 
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important elements but for which a State cannot exist.20 In the face of 
ever-increasing influence of the French philosophy of rationality and 
materialism, Ranke advocated for a counter-spiritual force – 
nationalism – to contain that influence: “The dominion which another 
nation threatens to gain over us can only be combated by developing 
our own sense of nationality.”21 And while explaining this nationalist 
spirit, he actually refers to “the real, existing one” – not merely an 
invented, illusionary nationality – which is expressed in the State.22 It 
implies, therefore, that the authentic root of the German nation-State 
needs to be traced; nothing could be a better tool to this end than the 
idea of ‘race’.  
 
3. The Ethnic Background of German Colonialism 
 
The nineteenth-century German idea of the ‘self’ – the ethnic 
nation – informed its relationship with colonies – the ‘other’ – in a 
number of ways. Although colonial proposals were discussed in the 
Frankfurt National Assembly in 1848, no major interest groups 
supported colonial expansion. The State governments, namely, 
Prussia, Hamburg, and Bremen, which were most in a position to 
effect a colonial policy, were against the idea of colonisation.23 
However, a majority of western German liberals remained an 
exception to this general trend. As a matter of fact, the liberals 
advocated colonial policy back in 1848 in the face of massive German 
emigration from the south-western Germany, which intensified with 
the growth of industrialisation and ensuing socio-economic changes. 
The German over population, especially in rural areas, was also said 
to have boosted emigration.24 During the period between 1830 and 
                                                 
20 Leopold von Ranke, “The Great Powers (1833),” inDahbour and Ishay (eds.),The 
Nationalism Reader, 158. 
21 Ibid., 159. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Woodruff D Smith, The German Colonial Empire (Chapel Hill: The University 
of North Carolina Press, 1978), 5. 
24 However, Smith argues that seen from a more modern standpoint, “emigration 
was the product, not of absolute overpopulation, but of the development of 
German agriculture towards large-scale capitalist forms under severe economic 
pressure, compounded by a gradual reduction in the size of independent farms 
through their division among sons of farmers”. See ibid., 10. 
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1860, over one million Germans left for the United States; others went 
to Brazil and Chile.25 After 1895, an estimated 830,000 Germans 
emigrated from Prussia alone, making depopulation a great threat to 
German nationalism.26 
Nevertheless, the liberals of 1848, whose prominence in politics at 
that time was temporary, considered colonisation as a policy option in 
non-nationalist terms. Their concern was that lower-class people, who 
had been displaced by changes in German agriculture, would become 
criminals and possibly revolutionary; thus, colonies would be a good 
option for exporting those people.27 Despite the fact that Bismarck 
allowed his political allies to appeal to sentiment in favour of colonies 
in order to rally support for unification in western Germany, he 
himself remained publicly opposed to overseas colonies until the 
1880s; based on the projected financial burdens of maintaining 
overseas colonies and the strategy of avoiding any serious 
confrontation with other major colonial powers.28 Therefore, it was 
not a surprise that most of Germany’s colonial acquisitions took place 
quite late, between April 1884 and February 1885.29 
                                                 
25 Edward J.Neather, “Introduction to the English Edition,” in JurgenZimmerer and 
Joachim Zeller (eds.), Genocide in German South-West Africa, trans. 
E.J. Neather (Monmouth: Merlin Press, 2008 [2003]), xix.  
26 Mark Mazower, Hitler’s Empire – Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe (London: 
Penguin Books, 2008), 21.  
27 Smith, The German Colonial Empire, 4. 
28 In a letter to the Minister for War, Bismarck wrote: “On the one hand the 
advantages for trade and industry of the motherland, which are expected from the 
possessions of colonies, for the most part are based on illusions. Because the 
costs caused by the establishment, support and maintenance of colonies, often 
exceed the benefit enjoyed by the motherland, as the experiences of England and 
France prove […]. On the other hand our navy is not yet sufficiently developed 
to take responsibility for the protection in distant states.  Finally, the attempt to 
found colonies in regions claimed by other states, no matter if with or without 
legitimation, would cause manifold, undesired conflicts.” See Hans Spellmeyer, 
Deutsche Kolonialpolitikim Reichstag (Stuttgart, 1931), 3, cited in Neather, 
“Introduction to the English Edition,” in Genocide in German South-West Africa, 
xxii. 
29 This timeline categorically applies to African colonies of South West Africa 
(April 1884), Togo (July 4-6, 1884), Cameron (July 14, 1884), and East Africa 
(February 1885). However, the official acquisition of colonies in the pacific and 
in China took place in 1899 and 1888, respectively. See Elise von Joeden-
Forgey, Nobody’s People: Colonial Subjects, Race Power and the German State, 
1884-1945, PhD dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 2004, ch. 1, fn. 1, 52.  
Colonial ‘Other’ in the 19th Century German Colonisation of Africa 23 
However, German ethnic nationalism soon emerged as a uniquely 
dominant factor in German politics in the discourse on the viability of 
colonial projects. German unification, its appearance as a Great Power 
in the middle of Europe, and intense international economic 
competition enhanced by the depression of 1873 – all contributed to 
an increased support for Germany’s participation in the colonial 
mission.While the depression simultaneously provided the German 
middle-class, who had to swallow the worst of it, with a fresh impetus 
for further emigration jeopardising the vision of a unified, ethnic 
German nation.30 The urge for protecting German culture by 
preventing de-Germanisation put the idea of emigrationist colonialism 
in a nationalist light that would conveniently reconcile both the needs 
of emigration and the protection of culture. In the words of Smith: 
Freedom to emigrate if conditions should become too unbearable was widely 
accepted as the ultimate recourse of the lower orders of respectable society, 
and parties (…) that emphasised continued freedom of emigration were 
supported by these groups. The same group also tended to support 
emigrationist colonialism, since colonies offered an alternative to normal 
emigration that preserved both the German culture of the emigrants and their 
contributions to the German economy. Especially after 1871 and the growth 
of lower-middle-class nationalism, colonialism attained some popularity 
because it reconciled patriotism with freedom to desert Germany.31 
 
Thus, the shift from a liberal vision of emigrationist colonialism to 
a more culturalist project accommodated nationalist passion.This also 
allowed Bismarck, who always kept alive his instrumental 
considerations for colonisation, to manoeuvre middle-class support for 
subjugating the left liberals from their electoral support in the 1870s 
and 1880s.32 
During the period 1879-1884, colonialist organisations played 
pivotal roles in popularising colonialism, and the intellectual figures 
behind the institutional campaign mostly put their arguments in ethno-
nationalist terms. For example, one of the foremost German colonial 
                                                 
30 At the same time, economic groups within Germany related their projected 
fortune to Germany’s success in colonial affairs. See Smith, 7.  
31 Ibid., 10-11. 
32 Ibid., 18. 
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activists and missionaries, Friedrich Fabri, initially premised his 
arguments in favour of colonies on economic considerations favoured 
by big businesses. Later he claimed that the population overflow 
caused by the natural vigour of the German race could be directed to 
the colonies.33 With his nationalist passion, Fabri “demonstrated 
graphically and alarmingly how the constant loss of Fatherland of 
youth, talent, skill, business ability and initiative (for it is always the 
best who go), was constantly depleting Germany of her vitality”.34 
Thus, his argument followed that settlement colonies would not only 
accommodate German farmers and small bourgeois with an 
agricultural economy and a traditional middle-class society, but also 
save the emigrants’ capabilities for Germany and would prevent their 
de-Germanisation.35 
Another colonialist, Wilhelm Hubbe-Schleiden, shared Fabri’s 
view of emigrationist colonialism in more aggressive terms. Despite 
his financial interests in a number of tropical trading concerns, his 
colonialist writings were devoted to downplaying the commercial and 
industrial sides of German life and emphasising the heroic, cultural, 
and agricultural aspects.36 For him, colonies were necessary to prevent 
the degeneration of the German people through industrialisation and 
the sapping of Germany’s strength through emigration. This would, 
thereby, maintain German culture and prevent its decline, in contrast 
to the example of England, “where the typical person had become a 
crass material and a cog in an industrial machine”.37 Depicting 
industry as a necessary evil that caused social and cultural damage, 
Hubbe-Schleiden found essentials of national ‘health’ and ‘power’, 
such as the human traits and social organisations, in the traditional 
agrarian economy. Thus, he envisaged that the ‘heroic’ German with 
                                                 
33 Friedrich Fabri, Bedarf Deutschland der Colonien? (Gotha, 1879), 1-13, 20-32, 
cited in ibid., 23. 
34 Mary Evelyn Townsend, Origins of Modern German Colonialism, 1871-1885 
(NY: Columbia University, 1921), 92. 
35 Fabri, BedarfDeutschland der Colonien?1-13, 20-32, cited in Smith, 23. 
36 Wilhelm Hubbe-Schleiden, UberseeischePolitik, 
eineCulturwissenschaftlicheStudie (Hamburg, 1881), 13-14, 74-75, cited in 
Smith, 24.  
37 Ibid., 24. 
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his agrarian culture would prosper in the colonies that would help 
Germany continue on its road to greatness and dominance.38 
A similar approach to the colonial project was taken by Carl Peters, 
the most famous of all colonialists of that time, who despite his 
personal interest in overseas trading companies nonetheless took a 
nationalist stance while he advocated that Germans living in 
overpopulated Germany had to move somewhere. He argued further 
that if Germany were to retain the productive power of the emigrants 
and protect their culture, colonies were a necessity.39 Although Peters 
and his associates established colonial trading enterprises, Smith 
notes, their propaganda often endorsed as well as advanced the 
popular idea of large-scale agricultural settlements.40 
Such a position on German colonialism was also taken by Heinrich 
von Treitschke, who conceived international relations essentially as 
self-interested arrangements outside the domain of law. He argued that 
“[f]or a nation that suffers from continual over-production, and sends 
yearly 200,000 of her children abroad, the question of colonisation is 
vital”.41 Having predicted that the German emigration would continue 
for a long while to be an unavoidable necessity even if Prussia 
resumed the colonisation of its eastern borderlands, he proposed that it 
was a new duty for the motherland to ensure that her ‘wandering 
children’ remained true to their nationality, and simultaneously open 
new channels for her commerce.42 Thus, he concluded that Germany 
was justified on the ground of ‘national self-preservation’ to seek 
ways and means to divert the stream of German emigrants into lands 
where they would be able to maintain their nationality.43 
                                                 
38 Ibid., 25. 
39 Carl Peters, GesammelteSchriften, ed. Walter Frank, 3 vols. (Munich, 1943), 
1:332-341, cited in Smith, 26. 
40 Carl Peters, ZurWeltpolitik (Berlin, 1912), 141-145, cited in Smith, 26. Smith 
notes that Peters is a difficult character to assess, who was genuinely interested 
in settlement colonies and German empowerment in world politics, but at the 
same time was quite keen to get his own share.  
41 Adolf Hausrath, com and trans, Treitschke: His Doctrine of German Destiny and 
of International Relations Together with a Study of His Life and Work (NY: G.P. 
Putnam and Sons, 1914), 205. 
42 Ibid., 207. 
43 Ibid., 209. 
Mohammad Shahabuddin 26 
However, although the nationalist agenda was at the forefront of 
colonial advocacy in the 1880s, a parallel stream of support from the 
German government and business interests in favour of colonial 
acquisition on non-nationalist grounds also emerged. Given the high 
degree of public support for nationalist notions of settlement colonies, 
protagonists of economic colonialism often relied on nationalist 
rhetoric to advance their own projects, while nationalists never 
dismantled the relevance of economic considerations for the viability 
of such a mega project of overseas settlement.44 Such moderate 
reconciliation offered Bismarck, who conceived of an ideal German 
colony in terms of the classic trading-colony model, the opportunity to 
manage domestic politics. As Smith notes:  
“Bismarck’s motives in acquiring colonies were complex and varied, but it 
appears from the available evidence that the basic impetus to expansion is to 
be found in domestic politics and Bismarck’s attempt to manipulate them.”45 
 
Nevertheless, with the strengthening of the conservative nationalist 
voice advanced by the Colonial Society and the Pan-German League 
after 1885, Bismarck was under increasingly high pressure to change 
his policy of trading colonialism.46 
In this sense, the very notion of German colonialism is a product of 
a series of inter-connected factors – nationalism, large business 
interests, government’s instrumentalist calculations, and domestic 
political dynamics – though often it appeared in the dichotomy of 
economic and settlement models of colonialism. But what we trace in 
particular is that nationalist elements, premised on middle-class 
support for initiating German settlements in colonies in order to 
protect German culture, remained a decisive force behind German 
colonial expansionism, which only gained strength with the passage of 
time, with Germany’s march towards greater expansion until she faced 
sheer humiliation in successive world wars. 
German international lawyers, Koskenniemi notes, started to write 
about colonialism only after Bismarck had changed his attitude 
towards colonisation in 1884. But their response to the subject was 
                                                 
44 Smith, The German Colonial Empire, 27. 
45 Ibid., 33. 
46 Ibid., 44. 
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based on municipal public law, instead of international law, in that 
they focused primarily on how German protectorates could be fitted 
into the imperial constitution.47 For them, colonisation was a natural 
part of Germany’s development into a leading European power. For 
example, the writings of the early commentators on colonialism such 
as Paul Heilborn, Karl Heimburger, and Friedrich Geffcken all 
understood colonisation as an obvious, natural phenomenon; they 
engaged themselves merely in justifying Germany’s right as a 
latecomer to the imperial venture, or in explaining the legal 
technicalities of the concepts of ‘protectorate’ and ‘territorial 
sovereignty’, for example.48 German jurist Heimburger maintained in 
1888 that the State’s quest for territory is a justified “expression of its 
life-energy” under international law, and is “protected as long as it 
does not conflict with the legal spheres of the other European 
States.”49 Such an approach of German international lawyers towards 
the colonial project essentially reflected their perception of the State 
as a racially superior organic body and its sovereign authority in 
absolute sense. 
Thus, in the Theory of the State, Bluntschli argued that the 
settlement of political communities in an uninhabited and scarcely 
cultivated country, with the intention of founding a new State, is a 
peaceful form of territorial acquisition. And then he maintained that if 
the ‘barbaric natives’ remained in the territory of the new colony, the 
superiority of the ‘civilised’ over a barbarous people would 
necessarily lead to the dominion of the former.50 In another place, 
while talking about the superiority of the Aryans as a philosophical 
and rational race, he noted that the Aryan races were superior because 
they emphasised the dignity and honour of human beings, in contrast 
to the Africans, who “allowed his master to enslave him, even threw 
himself on the ground before his master, and lifted the master’s foot 
                                                 
47 MarttiKoskenniemi, Gentle Civiliser of Nations: The Rise and Fall of 
International Law 1870-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 
109. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Cited in ibid. 
50 Johann KasparBluntschli, The Theory of the State (Ontario: Batoche Books, 
2000 [1885]), 219. 
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himself on his head.”51 Of the Aryan races with unparalleled political 
excellence, Bluntschli continued, it was the Germanic people who 
flourished most in the elevation and clarity of ideas regarding the 
theory of States. His conclusion followed that the Aryans were under a 
great historical responsibility to educate other races in political theory 
and statehood. Further, to teach them “to develop and complete the 
domination of the world which already lies in the hands of the Aryan 
peoples in a consciously humanistic and noble way, so as to teach 
civilisation for the whole mankind.”52 
This sense of Germanic racial superiority, Dampierre noted in 
German Imperialism and International Law, was offered a scientific 
basis by Darwinism. The evolutionary thoughts rationalised the 
imperialistic tendencies of intellectual Germanism not only by 
corroborating the idea of the inherent superiority of certain races, but 
also by scientifically justifying the elimination of the weak by the 
strong.53 It implied from this principle of unequal evolution that, 
among all the human races, it was the Germanic race that had 
undergone the most perfect evolution. Thus, German intellectuals 
believed that, seen from the point of view of Germany’s aptitude for 
expansion as an organised community, it had reached “a stage of its 
evolution at which it was incumbent upon all the others to submit to 
its sovereignty.”54 Treitschke’s disciple Bernhardi, therefore, declared 
on the eve of the First World War that 
[t]he struggle for existence is, in the life of Nature, the basis of all healthy 
development. All existing things show themselves to be the result of 
contesting forces. So in the life of man the struggle is not merely the 
destructive, but the life-giving principle. The law of the stronger holds good 
everywhere. Those forms survive which are able to procure themselves the 
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most favourable conditions of life, and to assert themselves in the universal 
economy of Nature. The weaker succumb.
55 
 
Bernhardi, thus, conceived of colonisation essentially as a matter of 
recognised right, for through colonisation “vast territories inhabited by 
uncivilised masses are occupied by more highly civilised States, and 
made subject to their rule. Higher civilisation and the correspondingly 
greater power are the foundations of the right to annexation.”56 Given 
that Germany was a late-comer in the imperial game and burdened 
with the surplus population which the mother-country could no longer 
feed, Bernhardi proposed that the only course left to Germany was to 
acquire the necessary territory by war: “Thus the instinct of self-
preservation leads inevitably to war, and the conquest of foreign soil. 
It is not the possessor, but the victor, who then has the right.”57 He 
maintained further that since might is the supreme right, and the 
dispute as to what is right is decided by war, might confers the right to 
occupy or to conquer. War, according to him, was a biological 
determinant between just and unjust, for its decisions rested on the 
very nature of things.58 
 
4. The Projection of the Ethnic ‘Self’ on the Colonial ‘Other’ 
through Exclusion  
 
While the German notion of the ethnic ‘self’ constituted a major 
force behind the German colonial mission in the internal context, 
however, in the external context, i.e. in Germany’s relationship with 
the colonial ‘other’, it demonstrated an inherently polygenic as well as 
exclusionist attitude towards the colonial ‘other’. It is also to be noted 
from the outset, within the dichotomous colonial model of nationalist-
settlement and instrumentalist-trading in German politics, Bismarck’s 
inclination for the latter offered only South West Africa as a suitable 
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venue for large-scale German settlement.59 South West Africa thus 
became the focal point of radical Rightists’ nationalist campaign for 
German settlement. It also offered an opportunity retrospectively to 
explore how the German nation, juxtaposed with the African natives 
in order to protect its ethno-national ‘self’ in the face of massive 
emigration, simultaneously endeavoured to ‘distance’ itself from the 
natives. This had to happen, paradoxically, for protecting its racial 
superiority from any undesired racial inter-mixing. The exclusion of 
the ‘other’ in forms of strict racial segregation on polygenic grounds 
was the obvious policy option to that end. 
Consequently, to combat the increasing number of marriages 
between whites and African women,60 the colonial government of 
South West Africa opted for legislation that would erect a significant 
barrier between natives and non-natives with a view to protecting “the 
ranks of Europeans against an influx of coloured blood.”61 When 
Governor Tecklenburg banned mixed marriages in 1905 in defiance of 
directives of the Department of Colonial Affairs in Berlin, he 
evidently relied on racial, exclusionist logic against mixed marriages: 
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Not only will the preservation of the purity of the German race and of 
German civilisation be very significantly harmed, but also, and above all, the 
authority of the white man will be endangered. […] experience had long 
shown, and not only in Africa, that when a white person lives for an extended 
period with a number of a subordinate race, it is not the latter who is elevated 
by the contact but the white person who is dragged down and ‘goes native’ as 
they say here. In the same way, experience shows that such relationships do 
not improve the race but cause it to deteriorate.62 
 
Segregation was also advanced by three notorious native 
ordinances of 1907 – the Control Ordinance, the Pass Ordinance, and 
the Master and Servant Ordinance – which together established a 
racist interventionist State within a legal framework. Jurgen Zimmerer 
notes that such a “policy of total control over the natives was at the 
very heart of German colonial rule from the very first consideration of 
how working relationships should be regulated as early as 1894.”63 
However, the exclusionist approach of the German colonial 
administration to the natives of South West Africa was demonstrated 
with utmost brutality in the events of the Herero genocide between 
1904 and 1907; events that in many ways appears as the prelude to the 
Holocaust during WWII. The Herero war offered the colonial 
administration the excuse to exterminate the whole Herero 
community; the commander in chief and the man in charge of this 
campaign – Lieutenant-General Lothar von Trotha – was very close to 
the completion of this task when he was called back to Germany in the 
face of controversy in the metropolis over his policy. Nearly 80% of 
the Herero people, i.e. 60,000 Herero, were annihilated by the 
Germans during this campaign: some in battles, some deprived of 
food and water when driven to the desert by the colonial army and 
blocked there, and the rest in the inhuman condition of ‘concentration 
camps’ in the aftermath of the war.64 During that time, von Trotha is 
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reported to have said that “the Herero people must leave the country. 
If they do not do so I shall force them with a big gun. Within the 
German frontiers every Herero, armed or unarmed, with or without 
cattle, will be shot dead. I shall take in no more women and children. I 
shall drive them back to their people or have them fired on.”65 The 
extermination order was finally lifted, but von Trotha’s policy 
received endorsement when the German Chief of Staff von Schlieffen 
wrote to the Chancellor in the following words: 
One can agree with him (von Trotha) in wishing to exterminate the whole 
nation or drive them out of the country […]. The racial war which has flared 
up can only be brought to an end by the extermination or total subjugation of 
the one party. The latter option is however not feasible in the long term, 
judged on currently valid assessments. Therefore the objective of General 
von Trotha can be approved. But he just does not have the forces to carry 
it through.66 
 
It is due to this practical limitation alone that the Chief of Staff 
appealed for the lifting of the extermination order. 
Such an endorsement of von Trotha’s genocidal policy was not 
confined to the military establishments alone. In a fascinating article, 
Medardus Brehl exhibits how the literature of the time perceived the 
annihilation of the Herero and Nama as “a legitimate means of dealing 
with the inevitable and necessary confrontation of ‘whites’ and 
‘blacks’, of ‘civilised’ and ‘uncivilised’”; a phenomenon that can be 
explained through the nineteenth-century concepts of German 
entitlement, revolutionary culture, social Darwinism, and 
historiography.67 Brehl demonstrates that besides the publications that 
came from a closed circle of a particular social interest group, 
mainstream authors with immense popularity among mass people, in 
fact portrayed the events in ethno-nationalist terms. Among the many 
authors that Brehl’s research reveals, the novel by Gustav Frenssen, 
entitled Peter Moors Fahrtnach Sudwest. Ein Feldzugsbericht (Peter 
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Moor’s Journey to the South West. A Campaign Report), published in 
1906 is of particular relevance given its Europe-wide reception.68 In 
his account of the South West African massacre, Frenssen portrays the 
incidents in purely nationalist terms, as a legitimate cause of ensuring 
German cultural homogeneity. For him, as Brehl notes, the 
extermination of the ‘existential other’ would not only suppress the 
threat posed to German culture, but would also allow men of diverse 
regional and social origins to create a homogeneous community. It is, 
therefore, legitimate as determined by evolutionary biology and the 
law of advanced cultural development, and hence, absolutely 
necessary.69 In the words of Frenssen, “these blacks deserve to die, 
before God and mankind, not because they murdered two hundred 
farmers and rose against us, but because they built no houses and dug 
no springs”.70 
As far as international lawyers were concerned, Koskenniemi 
notes, they produced no critical accounts about the extremely brutal 
response of the German colonial administration towards native 
uprisings, for they considered this a natural consequence of 
Germany’s emergence as a great colonial power.71 Dampierre argues 
that in the minds of German intellectuals, the notion of German racial 
superiority induced instincts of domination, and Germany’s military 
might, then, relied on the idea of violence with moral comfort.72 This 
form of violent domination was unique, in that it differed from the 
intellectual domination of the Latin races, or commercial ambitions of 
the Roman and British empires, or from the species of religious 
mysticism of the Arabs, or the artistic mysticism of the Hellenes.73 
Given that ‘Germanism’ was a civilisation deeply rooted in a 
particular race, instead of being a universal civilisation that had the 
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potential of accommodating other races, Dampierre asserts that the 
German imperialism was a force for elimination in contrast to that of 
the Hellenes, the Romans, the Arabs, the British, and the French, 
which had been in each case a force for assimilation; it is this original 
and dangerous characteristic that differentiated German imperialism 
from the rest of the civilised world.74 And Dampierre has put this in 
the following words:  
In fact, from the moment that the German becomes possessed with the idea of 
an innate superiority whether historic, providential or biological imposing on 
his race the obligation to civilise the world, his conception of the relative 
rights of nations must undergo a profound modification, the duty of 
expansion by means of elimination which this mission imposes being 
scarcely reconcilable with the right to exist of other nations.
75 
 
With this analogy, it was, therefore, natural that Imperial Germany 
would adopt brutal means in warfare in order to execute the ‘sacred’ 
task of elimination.76 
Nevertheless, in the political circle of the metropolis, information 
on the South West African atrocities created controversy over German 
colonial policy. Since the very beginning, colonialism had been a 
fertile source of political manoeuvring for almost all political 
philosophies. According to Smith, participants in the German political 
system employed colonialism as a tool to get what they wanted and as 
a means of overcoming some of the major deficiencies in the system – 
the government in particular was vulnerable to attack and criticism 
during the annual budget review by the Reichstag and Budget 
Commission.77 Following the reports of genocide of the Herero and 
Nama peoples, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) refused any further 
backing for the colonial war that initially led to the rejection of part of 
the supplementary budget submitted by the Government to pay for the 
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continuation of the colonial war in South West Africa, and finally, to 
the dissolution of the parliament.78 Paradoxically, in the elections to 
the Reichstag at the beginning of 1907 that followed the dissolution, 
nationalist campaigns depicted the SDP and the Centre Party as 
“enemies of colonialism, opposed to the national interest and traitors 
to the fatherland.”79 This along with other elements of election-
engineering offered the conservative block a majority in the 
Reichstag. Heyden notes that the election result had an ‘educational 
influence’ on German social democracy, in that it finally led to the 
development of concepts of ‘socialist colonialist policies’ in which 
colonies came to be perceived as an economic necessity and in the 
public interest of the German Reich.80 
Another less-complicated response in the metropolis towards 
German atrocities in the colonies was outright denial of any guilt on 
the grounds that such measures were either necessary or deviations of 
law that were punished; the strongest justification relied on the similar 
or even worse treatment of the natives by other European colonial 
Powers. An archetypical example of such a stance is the works of 
Heinrich Schnee, a lawyer, former colonial Governor, and a member 
of the Reichstag. In the context of Germany’s loss of colonies 
following the Great War, Schnee wrote: “the natives, satisfied, and 
more than satisfied, with German sovereignty, desired nothing better 
than its continuance.”81 Under the chapter-title ‘What the Natives 
Really Want’, he claimed that “[i]f a genuine, uninfluenced, and 
impartial plebiscite could be taken, Germany would need to have no 
fear as to the result of the native vote.”82 Throughout his writings, one 
can hardly ignore the racial foundations of his arguments. A similar 
approach was taken by Matthias Erzberger who held the view that 
although Germany had made mistakes in her colonial policy, such 
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mistakes were not greater than those of other colonial Powers.83 For 
him, colonialism was a matter of national pride as well as an 
indication of superiority; thus, in the aftermath of Germany’s defeat in 
the Great War, he declared that “Germany cannot, for the sake of her 
honour, submit to be shut out from the ranks of the colonising Powers. 
If she were struck out of the ranks of colonising nations, it would 
mean the moral degradation of Germany, and she would, from the 
cultural point of view, be inferior to countries like Portugal.”84 
 
5. The Ethnic ‘Otherness’ Reflects Back on the Understanding of 
the ‘Self’  
 
While Germany’s polygenic, exclusionist self-image was reflected 
in its extreme brutal extermination of the natives of South West 
Africa, in the metropolis the exclusion of the native ‘other’ on racial 
grounds took place through ‘distancing’. The late nineteenth-century 
German colonial enthusiasts, such as Carl Hagenbeck, Felix von 
Luschan, and Hilke Thode-Arora, had recourse to the idea of ‘colonial 
exhibitions’ (Völkerschauen) to highlight the distinctiveness of the 
natives, as well as to educate the Germans about the practicalities of 
the science of race. In one such exhibition in Hagenbeck’s Tierpark, 
clusters of authentic villages representing the cultures were built on 
either side of a path; they were numbered, labelled, and cross-
referenced in an educational brochure.85 To sharpen the line of 
difference between the native show-members and the European 
visitors, whose mutual communication was restricted, the arrangement 
in the Tierpark and Berlin’s Zoological Garden allowed the visitors, 
as von Joeden-Forgey notes, “to move from one display of people to 
the display of animals without leaving the grounds, a geographical 
fact that suggested a greater link between non-Western peoples and 
animals than between non-Western and Western peoples.”86 In 1896, 
the German State itself organised one of the largest colonial 
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exhibitions in Berlin’s Treptower Park to create the appearance of vast 
cultural and racial differences between Germans and colonial 
subjects.87 
Such a polygenic notion of racial segregation, and the proposition 
that “colonial governance was principally a matter of solving the ‘race 
problem’ was enough of a consensus issue by 1910”.88 One good 
example is African linguist Carl Meinhof, who despite his 
cosmopolitan image shared with the conservatives the aversion to 
racial mixing. While, given his background in Protestant theology and 
his work with Protestant missions, he kept relying on the monogenic 
idea behind the ‘civilising mission,’ he firmly opposed any idea of 
racial mixing, especially in relation to the natives.89 Meinhof even 
expressed concerns about Africans visiting, residing, and being 
educated in Germany, for in his view no African could ever be a true 
German.90 
This then was a moment of understanding the ethnic ‘self’ through 
its relationship with the ethnic ‘other’. Proponents of political 
racialism believed that colonial governance had taught the German 
State  
“that ‘mixing’ was a threat to national wellbeing, that race differences was a 
radical phenomenon involving completely opposing cosmic spaces, and that 
humanity (humanitarianism) must be exercised in conformity with racism’s 
scientific laws”.91 
 
With the conviction that a colonial model of racially exclusionist 
governance in the metropolis would secure Germany’s cosmic 
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superiority, leading proponents such as Josef Reimer, Klaus Wagner, 
and Heinrich Class juxtaposed colonial scenarios with the Eastern 
expansion in which the non-Aryan ‘other’ was excluded from the 
Germanic image of the ‘self’ in the pattern of colonial brutalities.92 
The liberal vision of universalism came under strong criticism here. 
Reimer found the notion of universal humanity as a ‘bastard-idea’ 
introduced by the ‘bastards of Roman Empire’, and if the Germanic 
race got engaged in it, according to him, alien races “would be able to 
‘smuggle’ themselves into the German body politic by virtue of the 
political openness fostered by false ideas of humanity”.93 He therefore 
hoped that the proper understanding of humanity in racial terms would 
awaken the German youth to the new possibilities as well as 
necessities of their time: the German State had to expand, and at the 
same time a strict separation of the races had to take place in the 
occupied territories as well as at home – ‘civitas Germanica’ – 
wherein persons with only Germanic blood would be incorporated and 
given equal rights.94 Similarly, Wanger described the whole idea of 
common humanity of a raceless world as “volk-adverse and therefore 
nature-adverse and therefore also culture-adverse”.95 
Thus, on the one hand, the notion of the ethnic German ‘self’ is 
reflected in its relationship with the native ‘other’ as expressed in the 
campaign for settlement colonies, and on the other, its polygenic 
exclusionist framework of dealing with the ‘other’ then reflected back 
on the image of the ‘self’ to make it even more racist, hence, 
exclusionist as the Nazi regime later demonstrated. In this sense, the 
nineteenth-century German understanding and actual execution of 
colonial policies sharply contrasted with the liberal vision of civilising 
the colonial ‘other’ through assimilation. As Meinhof asserted, 
German and French cultures were different in that Germans could not 
adopt ‘foreign ways’ without becoming a false people; this reflects 
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both “the long-standing Romantic critique of the French universalism” 
as well as “a more recent German colonial reformist critique of the 
supposedly assimilationist thrust of many French colonial policies”.96 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
What I emphasise in the foregoing brief sketch of German colonial 
policies is that the nineteenth-century colonial projects not only 
demonstrated an ethnic dichotomy of the European ‘self’ and the non-
European ‘other’, but also explained how this dichotomous 
relationship reflected the image of the ‘self’ on the ‘other’ and in 
return, this interaction with the ‘other’ was then reflected back in the 
dynamic process of constructing the ‘self’. I also demonstrate how 
nineteenth-century international law played its part in this complex 
process by reflecting its understanding of the ‘self’ in legal terms – the 
State – in the legal response to the colonial ‘other’ and the colonial 
project as a whole.  
However, the whole notion of the European ‘self’ was drastically 
shaken with the force of nationalism reaching its peak on the eve of 
the Great War. The ethnic discourse on self and other came to shape 
the interwar international law, in relation to the protection of the left-
outs and the minorities in the process of crafting the national self-
image in Eastern and Central European States in conservative sense. 
The very foundation of this interwar mechanism relied on how the 
liberal West portrayed the ethnic non-Western ‘other’ within Europe 
in contrast to its own image of the ‘self’ – a pattern that reappeared in 
the post-Cold War European mechanisms of minority protection. In 
this sense, international law, developed through the nineteenth century 
discourse on the liberal and conservative streams of identity 
formation, demonstrates the ethnic dichotomy of ‘self’ and ‘other’ 
even in its present-day use. 
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